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Abstract:
This paper presents a business cycle analysis of monetary policy shocks measured by dis-
turbances to open market operations, i.e. the ratio of open market papers to non-borrowed
reserves. We …nd empirical evidence for the usefulness of this policy measure, as it predicts
signi…cant declines in output, M1 growth, and prices, as well as a signi…cant rise in interest
rates after a monetary contraction. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with
…nancial intermediation where monetary policy is conducted via open market operations.
In accordance with our empirical …ndings, a monetary tightening leads to a fall in output,
monetary aggregates, and factor prices. In contrast to an alternative model speci…cation
with money growth shocks, our model with disturbances to open market operations also
generates a persistent rise of nominal and real interest rates on securities in response to a
monetary contraction. Furthermore, the introduction of staggered prices is demonstrated to
improve the model’s ability to replicate second moments of empirical time series.1 Introduction
Standard monetary business cycle models assume that money supply is exogenous. The
growth rate of money supply is usually assumed to follow a stochastic process. Hence,
monetary policy is identi…ed by innovations to the growth rate of money, even if the latter
is speci…ed as a broad aggregate. Changes in money supply are injected lump sum directly
either to the households or to the …nancial intermediaries. Short-run e¤ects on real activity
driven by these nominal transfers are generated by an in‡ation tax, price or wage rigidities
on the one hand,1 and trading frictions on asset markets on the other hand.2 Contrary to
these studies on monetary policy analysis, we construct a model where monetary policy is
conducted via open marketoperations. Since open marketoperationsare the most commonly
used instrument of monetary authorities in developed countries, we identify innovations
to open market trades as exogenous monetary policy measures.3 Shocks to open market
operations a¤ect the ‡ow of funds in the entire …nancial system. Thus, changes in monetary
aggregates are endogenously determined by responses of the whole macroeconomic system.
The limited participation framework, which has become widely used in equilibrium mon-
etary business cycle theory, also applies the concept of exogenous money growth.4 As its
main advantage in comparison to models with goods markets frictions, the limited participa-
tion model generates rising nominal interest rates in response to decreased liquidity because
households do notimmediately adjusttheirnominal savings in response toa monetary policy
shock. A …nancial intermediary receives deposits from the households and nominal injections
from the central bank which both are supplied to the loan market. A decline in loanable
funds due to monetary tightening leads to a rise in interest rates, decreasing factor inputs,
which are …nanced by loans, and a real contraction. As Lucas (1990), Christiano (1991),
and Fuerst (1992) show, the rise in interest rates due to this liquidity e¤ect lasts only one
period even if injections are persistent. Changes in monetary transfers are compensated by
households’ portfolio adjustments in the subsequent period. Without imposing further port-
folio frictions,5 the so-called anticipated in‡ation e¤ect dominates after one period, leading
to declining interest rates.
1Examples of this literature include models with i) an in‡ation tax, e.g. Cooley and Hansen (1989), ii)
cash-in advance constraints, e.g. Lucas and Stokey (1987) or Cooley and Hansen (1997), iii) sticky prices,
e.g. Ohanian and Stockman (1994), Chari et al. (1996), Rotemberg (1996), Yun (1996), iv) price adjustment
costs, e.g. Hairault and Portier (1994), v) wage rigidities, e.g. Cho and Cooley (1995) or Jeanne (1998), to
name but a few.
2In models of limited participation, e.g. Lucas (1990), Fuerst (1992), Cristiano and Eichenbaum (1992),
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), and Christiano et al. (1997a), real e¤ects of monetary injections are due
to an unsyncronized participation of households and …rms in …nancial markets.
3An alternative choice of the monetary policy instrument has been prominently applied in recent work
on business cycle modeling. Following Taylor (1993), the monetary authority is assumed to set the short-
term nominal interest rate depending on the history of in‡ation, output, and the interest rate itself. See, for
example, Rotembergand Woodford (1997, 1998)and McGrattan (1999). Especially in thecaseof an interest-
rate rule, the rational expectations equilibrium is often indeterminate (see, e.g., Bernanke and Woodford,
1997, and Christiano et al., 1997b).
4As an exception, Chari et al. (1995) also introduce an ’endogenous’ component to money creation as
they tie the money growth rate to the rate of technological innovation in their model. They assume banks to
hold both borrowed and non-borrowed reserves in order to produce demand deposits and are able to study
the cyclical behavior of various monetary aggregates.
5In order to generate persistent liquidity e¤ects, Chari et al. (1995) and Cooley and Quadrini (1999)
assume that the adjustment of households’ portfolios is costly.
1We start our analysis with the assumption that the monetary authority is able to control
the ratio of open market securities outstanding to non-borrowed reserves of banks. By
applying vector autoregressive representations of the macroeconomic system, we provide
empirical evidence that orthogonal shocks to such a ratio reasonably measure exogenous
disturbances to monetary policy. Responses of real GDP, prices, money growth, and interest
rates to open market shocks are comparable to the responses of these variables to federal
fundsrate innovations, whereas responsestoalternative measuresare clearly lesspronounced.
These results as well as the responses of various other macroeconomic variables support our
identi…cation of monetary policy shocks in our business cycle model with innovations to the
ratio of the assets exchanged in open market operations, namely, securities and reserves.
When the monetary authority tightens monetary policy, it uses swaps of ownerships over
securities. It provides reserves in exchange for open market instruments, typically in the
form of government debt. As the monetary authority controls the open market ratio, it
a¤ects the liquidity of the entire …nancial system and the portfolio composition of banks
and households in our model.6 Banks react to a contractionary monetary policy measure by
adjusting their security holdings, their reserves, and theirlending to …rms. Accordingly, total
reserves of the banking systemare determined by both monetary policy measuresand money
demand by the banks. Interest rates are mainly determined by changes in the liquidity of
the …nancial system, leading to a persistent rise in nominal interest rates in response to
a monetary tightening. With higher lending rates, the prices of labor and capital rise as
the factor remunerations has to be …nanced by loans and, consequently, factor demand and
production decline.
We develop a quantitative general equilibrium model of the US economy. We abstract
from trading frictions. Money is introduced in the utility function. We also aim to add to
the recent literature, e.g. Ohanian et al. (1995), Chari et al. (1996), or Yun (1996), which
has discussed the e¤ects of sticky prices on the propagation mechanism, and allow for price
staggering in our model. As another distinguishing feature of our model, we incorporate
a banking sector with costly …nancial intermediation.
7 Banks take funds from households
and lend these funds to …rms with lending rates exceeding the rate of return on open mar-
ket instruments, namely, bonds. In order to abstract from liquidity e¤ects due to limited
participation, households funds are deposited at banks and withdrawn within one period.
Monetary policy works in part via bank lending and in part via price stickiness.
The speci…cation of monetary policy in the form of open market operations is contrasted
with the standard approach to describe monetary policy by exogenous money growth. The
performance of the business cycle models with these two speci…cations formonetary policy is
assessed by comparing the models implications for the behavior of macroeconomic variables
with empirical observations from the postwar US economy. In particular, we estimate VARs
and compare the empirical responses to monetary policy shocks with the ones implied by
our models. Furthermore, we compare the empirical correlations of various variables with
the corresponding correlations as computed from the simulations of our theoretical models.
6Schreft and Smith (1998) apply a similar speci…cation of monetary policy to investigate long-run e¤ects
of monetary policy regimes. They show that, in an OLG model, changes in the monetary policy stance can
generate multiple equilibria with ambiguous e¤ects on real activity.
7Díaz-Giménez et al. (1992) provide a general equilibrium model with a similar banking sector. Contrary
to our model, Díaz-Giménez et al. assume banks to intermediate between households and the government
sector and, in particular, the interest rate on government bonds to be exogenous.
2In accordance with recent literature on monetary business cycles, we …nd that a business
cycle model with exogenous monetary growth has various de…ciencies in reproducing the
empirical e¤ects of monetary policy shocks.
8 Endogenizing money in our benchmark model
where monetary policy is conducted by open market operations helps to overcome most of
these de…ciencies. In particular, nominal interest rates rise persistently in response to tight
money. Compared to the monetary injection case, the impulse response function of output
displays persistence especially if prices are more ‡exible. Furthermore, contemporaneous
correlations of the monetary policy measures and output, di¤erent monetary aggregates,
nominal assets, in‡ation, interest rates, and velocity implied by the simulation of our theo-
retical model accord well with empirical observations. The performance of our model with
respect to the magnitudes of the responses to monetary policy shocks is strongly improved
when price stickiness is introduced into the model.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides short-run empirical e¤ects
of di¤erent monetary policy measures. We present our results from empirical estimates
based on VAR analysis of US data over the period 1960:1 – 1999:1. In section 3, our model
is introduced and calibrated with regard to characteristics of the US economy. In section
4, the numerical results of the model are presented. First, we present impulse responses
for the two money shocks considered in this paper, the open market operations shock and
the money growth shock. Second, we study the e¤ect of di¤erent model speci…cations on
the persistence and the amplitude of the impulse response function of output. Finally, we
present second moment properties for our theoretical models and compare them with the
empirical counterparts. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical E¤ects of Monetary Policy Shocks
In this section we present empirical evidence on the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks. In
business cycle models innovations to broad monetary aggregates are commonly used as a
measure of monetary policy. A change in such an aggregate, however, does not only depend
on exogenous policy disturbances, but also on money demand. Obviously, in empirical
analyses of monetary policy e¤ects, other measures needs to be applied which appropriately
re‡ects exogenous changes of monetary policy. As proposed by Bernanke and Blinder (1992)
and Sims (1986), we choose the federal funds rate as the monetary policy instrument in our
benchmark analysis. Our second measure of the monetary policy instrument employs the
assets which are exchanged between the monetary authority and the banks in the course
of open market operations. In particular, we choose the ratio of outstanding open market
papers to non-borrowed reserves of banks. This measure, of course, re‡ects the view that
the monetary authority conducts monetary policy only via open market operations.
In order to identify the shocks to monetary policy, we assume that the Federal Reserve
follows a speci…c policy rule for its choice of the interest rate or, respectively, the open
market ratio. As in Christiano et al. (1996) and Sims and Zha (1998), the monetary policy
rule depends on the current and past state ¡t of the economy. Monetary policy shocks can
be identi…ed by serially uncorrelated innovations ²instr
t in the linear monetary policy rule:
INSTRt = g(¡t)+²instr
t ; where INSTR denotes the prevailing policy instrument and g is a
linear function. This speci…cations allows us to measure the impulse responses of a variable
to a monetary policy shock by a regression of this respective variable on the history of the
8See Christiano and Eichenbaum (1997) and Cooley and Hansen (1998).
3Figure 1: Impulse Responses to One S.D. INSTR Innovations § 2 S.E.
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Response of FFRATE to LOG(OMR)
Note: The impulse response functions are computed from the 5-variable VARs: (GDP_92, GDPDEFL,
PPI_RAW, INSTR, M1GR), with INSTR 2 {FFRATE, OMR}. For the computation of the last impulse
response in each set M1GR is replaced by D 2 {FFRATE, OMR} in the 5-variable VAR.
residuals ²instr. We compute the impulse responses of various variables to policy innovations
from …tting a particular vector autoregression (VAR). The estimation errors are orthogonal-
ized by a Choleski decomposition so that the covariance matrix of the resulting innovations
²t is diagonal. Policy innovations ²
instr
t are obtained using the following ordering of the
variables: (£t; INSTRt; Dt); where £t denotes the j contemporaneous variables in ¡t and
²instr
t is the (j + 1)th element of ²t. The recursive ordering implies that the vector £ has
a contemporaneous impact on the policy measure, whereas D a¤ects the measure INSTR
only via lagged values:
The VARs are estimated with quarterly data over the period 1960:1–1999:1, using four
lags of the variables. All variables are seasonally adjusted and, with the exception of rates,
logged. Considering the small data sample, we keep the amount of variables in the VAR as
small as possible. The vector £ contains GDP in prices of 1992 (GDP 92), the GDP de‡ator
(GDPDEFL), and the PPI of raw materials as an index of sensitive prices (PPI RAW).9
The aim to include a contemporaneous sensitive price index in the information set is to
get rid of the so-called ”price puzzle” in VARs when monetary policy shocks are identi…ed
with innovations in the federal funds rate or in non-borrowed reserves.10 Hence, each VAR
9This type of information assumption is also applied by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Strongin (1995),
and Christiano et al. (1996, 1999), among others. Our speci…cation departs from these studies with respect
to the choice of a sensitive price index. E.g., Christiano et al. (1999) apply a component in the Bureau of
Economic Analysis’ index of leading indicators as a sensitive commodity price index.
10Sims (1992) provides a discussion of this solution of the counter-intuitive price behavior in monetary
VARs.
4contains …ve macroeconomic variables. The following …gures present impulse responses of
various economic variables (£ and D) to one standard deviation of the prevailing monetary
policy innovation. The standard errorsused for the impulse response functions are computed
by applying the Monte Carlo method with 100 repetitions. Point estimates are represented
by solid lines and the two standard error band, providing a 95% con…dence interval, is given
by the dashed lines. The time axis displays quarterly periods.
In Fig. 1 the impulse response functions of selected variables are displayed for a shock to
the twomonetary policy instrumentsunder consideration, the federal funds rate (FFRAT E)
and the open market ratio (OMR). In our benchmark speci…cation, the money growth
rate of M1 (M1GR) is chosen as the variable D and, therefore, a¤ects monetary policy
only with a lag.11 In additional VARs we replace M1GR by the other monetary policy
measure (D = OMR or FFRAT E). Fig. 1A presents responses of economic variables to an
innovation in the federal funds rate (FFRATE). In accordance with related studies, e.g.
Christiano et al. (1999), we …nd that the rise of the FFRATE in response to its innovations
is persistent. Production declines with a short delay, while money growth decreases and
OMR falls immediately. The price index of raw materials declines after two periods, but not
signi…cantly. The counter-intuitive rise in the GDP de‡ator is reduced by the introduction
of PPI RAW, even though it is not completely o¤set during the …rst periods.
Our second policy measure is the relation between the assets exchanged in open market
operations, namely securities and high-powered money. We identify the …rst one with the
total amount of open market papers outstanding (OMPAP). For the second type of asset
we apply non-borrowed reserves (NBRES). The resulting monetary policy measure, which
is computed as: OMR =
OMPAP
NBRES ; can also be interpreted as the inverse of the relative
price of non-borrowed reserves in terms of open market securities. We suggest that this
measure is more suitable than pure monetary aggregates, such as M1, M0, or reserves, for
the identi…cation ofexogenousmonetary policy disturbances.12 Fig. 1B presents the dynamic
responsesof macroeconomic variables which are computed with a VARusing the innovations
to the open market ratio (OMR) as the measure of monetary policy shocks. The pattern
of these responses is almost identical to those presented in Fig. 1A. The decline in output
is signi…cant until the 6th period, but it is less pronounced and persistent compared to the
output response to FFRATE innovations. The responses of M1GR, OMR; and FFRATE
are very similar compared to the latter case, although, they di¤er in the amplitude. Most
noteworthy and in contrast to the case of the FFRATE shocks the responses of prices
display no tendency to rise and even decline signi…cantly after 4-6 periods.
We also apply other measures of monetary policy shocks, namely, changes in total open
market papers, non-borrowed reserves, non-borrowed reserves adjusted for contemporaneous
changes in total reserves (NBRX),13 and changes in the growth rate of M1. Except for
OMPAP, these monetary policy measures are also applied by Christiano et al. (1999) in
11All growth rates in this paper are computed as the ratio of two successive values (e.g.: M1GR =
M1t=M1t¡1).
12See Eichenbaum (1991) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) for a discussion of the appropriateness
to identify changes in non-borrowed reserves rather than changes in broader monetary aggregates like M0
or M1 as a measure for monetary policy shocks. Strongin (1995) even argues that changes in reserves are
mainly driven by the Federal Reserves accomodation of changes in the demand for reserves.
13This measure of exogenous monetary policy shocks has been proposed by Strongin (1995) in order to
control for changes in the demand for reserves. We follow Christiano et al. (1999) and implement this
measure by setting INSTR = NBRES and including total reserves (TOTRES) in £t.
5their VAR analyses of various monetary policy shock measures. We …nd that the impact
of the innovations in these measures on output, prices, the growth rate of M1, and the
federal funds rate is less pronounced than the impact of OMR innovations or even insignif-
icant.14 The impulse responses of the respective VARs, similar to those underlying Fig. 1,
are displayed in Fig. A1 in Appendix A.
The e¤ects of both monetary policy shocks (FFRAT E; OMR) on further variables
are presented in Fig. 2. Here, we focused on the already mentioned …nancial variables
(OMPAP,NBRES) and credit market instruments at the Federal Reserve (DEBT FR),
the 3 month T-bill rate (TBILL R), the bank prime loan rate (PRLOAN R), bank loans
(BLOANS), the growth rate of the monetary base (M0GR) and of M2 (M2GR), as well
as the non-…nancial variables employment (EMPL), the standardized unemployment rate
(UNEMPL R), corporate pro…ts (PROFITS), and the growth rate of the consumer price
index CPIt=CPIt¡1 (INFL).
In response to a federal funds rate shock, debt holdings of the Federal Reserve and non-
borrowed reserves decline immediately (see Fig. 2A). The amount of open market papers
rises strongly. The increase in both interest rates, the three-month T-bill rate and the bank
prime loan rate, is even more pronounced. Employment rises initially, while it declines after
3 periods. The qualitative response pattern of the unemployment rate is opposite to the
one of employment, even though the dynamic responses are statistically less signi…cant.15
Bank loans and corporate pro…ts decline with a delay of 2-3 periods. M2 growth displays
a response similar to the response of M1 growth as presented in Fig. A1. The response of
the monetary base growth rate is very small and insigni…cant. In accordance with the above
mentioned counter-intuitive behavior of the GDP de‡ator, the growth rate of CPI (INFL)
rises signi…cantly in the …rst periods.
The responses of the macroeconomic variables to a shock in the open market ratio are
graphed in Fig. 2B. Except for the response of in‡ation, they exhibit approximately the
same pattern as the responses in Fig. 2A and di¤er only with regard to the amplitudes.
While the responses are weaker for the interest rates T BILL R and PRLOAN R or in-
signi…cant for DEBT FR, BLOANS; and UNEMPL R, they are more pronounced for
PROFIT S;NBRES; and OMPAP. Regarding the response of the in‡ation rate, we …nd
an insigni…cant decline following a positive OMR shock.
To summarize, the …ndings in this section con…rm that the innovations to the open
market ratio represent a useful alternative to the federal funds rate for the identi…cation of
monetary policy shocks. Per construction, it considers the relative change of assets at both
sides of an open market transaction and identi…es the ‡ow of funds pendant to the interest
rate measure (FFRATE). Further, the comparison with other monetary policy measures,
such as monetary aggregates, shows that the OMR measure is capable of generating more
pronounced and signi…cant responses of variables like output, money growth, interest rates,
and prices, which are the common focus in the analysis of monetary policy shocks.
14Particularly, innovations of open market papers generate weaker responses of M1 growth and the federal
funds rate, whereas changes in nonborrowed reserves and M1 growth have an insigni…cant impact on output
and prices. While changes in the adjusted non-borrowed reserves measure (NBRX) are able to produce a
signi…cant ouput decline, their impact on prices and M1 growth are insigni…cant.
15This pattern changes when the labor market variables are included in £. In this case, employment
decreases and the unemployment rate rises moderately.
6Figure 2: Impulse Responses to One S.D. INSTR Innovations § S.E.
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Response of LOG(INFL) to LOG(OMR)
Note: TherespectiveVARsareestimated with …ve variables: (GDP_92, GDPDEFL,PPI_RAW,INSTR,
D), where INSTR 2(FFRATE, OMR) is the monetary policy measure and D is the variable whose
responses are displayed in the …gure.
73 The Model
In this section we present a dynamic general equilibriummodel with a …nancial intermediary
sector. It distinguishes between two monetary aggregates, inside money and outside money.
This feature, in particular, allows us to study the propagation of monetary shocks via the
banking sector. Lending is assumed to be costly. We employ open market operations as ex-
ogenous monetary policy measures in our benchmark case. For comparison, we also consider
a monetary policy characterized by exogenous money growth. Price stickiness is introduced
via monopolistic retailers who set their prices according to Calvo’s (1983) staggered price
setting. Further, we consider adjustment costs in the accumulation of physical capital.
3.1. Households
We assume that households are identical and of measure one. The expected lifetime utility













; with 0 < ¯ < 1: (1)
Expectations Et are taken conditional on informations at the beginning of period t. The
instantaneous utility u (:) isdiscounted with the factor ¯: The utilityfunction u islogarithmic
in consumption c; real money balances m =
M








= ° lnct +(1¡°)ln
Mt
pt
+ ´ln(1 ¡lt); with ´; ° > 0: (2)
The time endowment is normalized to one. Hence, labor supply equals l: Total assets of
the households comprise government bonds B
h; physical capital k, and cash M: Nominal
assets (Bh; M) are denoted by upper-case letters, while real assets (bh; k; m) are denoted by
lower-case letters. Households are the owners of the …rms, banks, and retailers. The budget
constraint of the representative household can be written as:
ptct +Mt+1 +B
h
t+1 +ptet = Mt+(1+ it)B
h







where p; e; w; r; i; ¿; -f;-b
t; and -r
t denote the price level, investment expenditures, the wage,
the real rate of return on physical capital, the nominal rate of return on bonds, a lump-sum
transfer from the government, and the dividends from …rms, banks, and retailers. The
households’ debt holdings are managed by banks and both their wage income and their
capital income are deposited into checking accounts. We introduce adjustment costs of






kt + (1¡±)kt; (4)
where ± denotes the depreciation rate of capital and the adjustment cost function ©(:) is
increasing and concave with ©(0) = 0:16 The introduction of adjustment costs provides a
variable price of physical capital q in termsof the numeraire good and drivesa wedge between
16This function can also be interpreted as marginal adjustment costs in the production of capital. Invest-
ment expenditures e yield a gross output of new capital goods ©(e=k)k:
8the real return on capital and the real return on bonds. The adjustment cost function is
chosen to generate a steady state value of the capital price q equal to one.
Maximizing lifetime utility (1) subject to the ‡ow constraint (3) and the accumulation
equation (4) with respect to consumption, leisure, investment expenditures, physical capital,
bond holdings, and cash leads to the following …rst order conditions:
¸t =°=ct; (5)




















































The Lagrangian multiplier ¸ is associated with the budget constraint (3). The …rst two
equations guarantee that the households equate the marginal utilities of both goods (con-
sumption and leisure) to the marginal utility of wealth timesthe price of the respective good.
The shadow price of physical capital q
¤, which equals the Lagrangian multiplier associated
with (4), can be derived by multiplying ¸ with the market price of capital q: Equation (7)
determines the market price of capital. The last three equations are arbitrage conditions
concerning the return on physical capital, bonds, and cash. Equation (9) is the standard
intertemporal allocation condition. Equation (10) describes the optimal allocation of cash
over time.
3.2. Production
Identical and perfectly competitive …rms produce the wholesale good y. We assume that






t ; with 0 < ® < 1; (11)





The autoregressive parameter ½a is less than one and the innovations "a are i.i.d., with
"a » N(0; ¾2
a). Firms’ pro…ts are distributed among the …rm owners, the households. Labor
and capital is rented at perfectly competitive factor markets. It is assumed that …rms have
to use bank credits Zt to pay the wage bill ptwtlt and the return on physical capital ptrtkt:
Zt = ptwtlt +ptrtkt: (13)
Equation (13) can also be interpreted as a credit-in-advance constraint. The funds Z a …rm
borrows from a bank are made available in form of checking accounts. At the end of the





















where pw isthe price of the wholesale good and x =
p
pw isthe markup on the …nal good. Firms
maximize their pro…ts subject to the labor and capital input. The …rst order conditions of





























The …rms equate the marginal cost of a unit of labor (capital) to the marginal productivity
of labor (capital).
3.3. Retail
A price rigidity is introduced via a retail sector. It consists of monopolistically competitive
retailers. Each retailer i 2 (0;1) sells a quantity yi of the wholesale good at price pi. The













where ² denotes the elasticity of substitution between retail goods and is assumed to be



















We assume that retailers set their prices according to Calvo’s (1983) staggered price setting.
The retailerchanges itsprice in a given period with probability (1¡Á): This behavior can be
interpreted as retailers changing prices only at the time they receive a price-change signal.
The probability of receiving such a signal (s ¡t) periods from period t is assumed to be
independent of the last time the signal has been received, Á
s¡t. A retailer who does not
receive a signal sets its price according to the following rule:
pit = ¼pit¡1;
where ¼ denotes the steady state value of the gross in‡ation rate ¼t =
pt
pt¡1. A retailer who
receives a price-signal in period t chooses a price e pit to maximize his expected discounted
17As will be shown below, the lending rate exceeds the rate of return on bonds in equilibrium, il ¡i > 0.

















where the discount factor is given by the owners of the retail …rms, the households. Maxi-
mizing (20) with respect to e pit, taking the price pwof the wholesale good as given; yields the




























The price index adjusts only partially to changes in demand. With price staggering, output
and the price index rise with increasing demand.18
3.4. Financial Intermediation
Financial intermediation is conducted by banks which transformdepositsfromhouseholdsto
loans. Banking is assumed to be costly and is a¤ected by …nancial regulation and monetary
policy measures. The monetary authority imposes a reserve-requirement ratio µ on total
funds deposited by households. Banks hold these reserves at the monetary authority. We
assume that no interest is paid on reserves. Further, the monetary authority is assumed to
conduct open market operations. We apply the same speci…cation of the monetary policy
measure asin ourempirical analysis in section 2. Hence, monetary policyshocksare modelled
as exogenous changes in the ratio ¹
omr of the total amount of bonds B held by the agents in
the economy to reserves S : ¹omr
t = Bt+1=St. Since we do not consider optimal government
policies, the monetary policy measure ¹omr is assumed to be stochastic.
As an alternative measure of monetary policy, we consider exogenous growth of a mone-
tary aggregate as it is common in the literature on monetary business cycle theory. For this
case, the growth rate of the monetary base Ht, which consists of cash holdings of households
and banks’ reserves, is assumed to be stochastic: ¹
mgr
t = Ht+1=Ht: Both policy measures are










t; for i = omr, mgr: (23)
The autoregressive parameters ½i are smaller than one and the innovations "i are i.i.d., with
"i » N(0;¾2
i) for i = omr;mgr:
The banking sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Banks take deposits from the
households and provide loans Z to the …rms at the rate il: Further, they hold bonds Bb and
reserves S: The households are assumed to deposit their factor remunerations ptwtlt +ptrtkt
at the beginning of the period at the bank. As the households withdraw these funds at the
end of the same period, they do not receive interest on these funds.
19 Banks’ liabilities must
18Total dividends of the retail sector amount to -r
t = (1¡1=xt)yt.
19The timing of deposit and withdrawal of funds follows Chari et al. (1995).
11equal their total assets:
B
h
t + ptwtlt + ptrtkt = St + Bt +Zt; (24)
where total bonds B equal Bh + Bb. Banks hold high-powered money, i.e. reserves, to
ful…ll the reserve requirements imposed on deposit holdings. Since high-powered money is a
non-interest bearing asset, banks do not hold excess reserves in equilibrium:
St = µ (ptwtlt + ptrtkt); (25)
where µ denotes the reserve requirement ratio. We assume that lending is costly. These
costs can be rationalized by screening and monitoring activities of banks. The costs ª(z)








Taken as given the time path of the interest rates and the monetary policy variable f¹tg the
banks maximize their pro…ts subject to (24) and (25) with respect to loans and bonds. The
…rst order condition is given by20
i
l
t = it + ªz (zt); (27)
where ªz (zt) denotes the …rst derivative of the lending cost function.
3.5. Government
The government, or, equivalently, the monetary authority, sets the reserve-requirement ratio
µ and the monetary policy instrument ¹. The government’s ‡ow constraint is given by:
(1+it)Bt ¡Bt+1 = Ht+1 ¡Ht + ptª(zt) ¡pt¿t: (28)
In order to avoid social costs of intermediation we assume that banking costs ª are private
and have to be paid to the government. Although this does not accord perfectly to the
banking costrationale, these costsmightbe interpreted asagency paymentsfor monitoringor
administrative services. The increase in government debt, Bt+1 ¡Bt, is equal to the interest
payment on government debt, itBt, minus the receipts from money creation, Ht+1 ¡ Ht,
private costs of banking, ptÃ(zt), and transfers pt¿t:
3.6. Competitive Equilibrium
The conceptof acompetitive equilibriumisapplied. The state variablesforthe representative
household are s
e = (K; H; B; ¼) and s
x = (a; ¹); where s
e and s
x denote the vector of
endogenous state variables and the vector of stochastic state variables, respectively. The
competitive equilibrium then consists of a maximum value for the household’s objective













t): Further, it consists of a corresponding set of aggregate per capita















20These conditions can also be derived by maximizing the discounted pro…ts of a bank considering the
following ‡ow constraint: Bb
t+1 + St+1 = (1+ it)Bb
t +il
tZt +St ¡ ptª(zt) ¡pt-b
t:
12decision rules and functions have tosatisfy the following conditions: 1. Households maximize
their lifetime utility (1) taken prices as given, i.e. (5)-(9) hold. 2. The banks’ and …rms’
pro…ts are maximized, i.e. (15)-(16) and (27) hold. 3. The stochastic variables follow the
processes described in (12) and (23). 4. The government’s balanced budget constraint is
satis…ed (28). 5. Individual and aggregate variables are consistent. 6. All factor, asset,
goods, and money markets clear:
y
f






Ht =St + Mt: (31)
3.7. Model Parametrization
To calibrate the model we choose values for the preference and technology parameters which
are fairly standard.21 The discount factor of households ¯ is set equal to 1:03¡0:25. The
production elasticity of capital ® is set equal to 0.36. Quarterly depreciation of physical
capital ± isassigned a value of0.0212. Astotal time available forthe householdsis normalized
to 1, steady state labor input is set equal to 0.3. The utility parameter ° is set equal to
0.996, implying an average velocity GDP=M1 of 6.79. The steady state value of total factor
productivity a is set equal to 1.
Table 1: Values of Preference and Technological Parameters
Parameter Descriptions Value
® Production Elasticity of Capital 0.36
° Parameter of Utility Function 0.996
² Substitution Elasticity of Retail Goods 6
¯ Discount Rate 0.9926
± Depreciation Rate of Physical Capital 0.0212
µ Reserve Requirement Ratio 0.06
©00 e
k=©0 Elasticity of Capital Adjustment Cost -0.25
ªz Lending Spread 0.006
l Steady State Labor Supply 0.3
Y =M Velocity 6.79
B=Y Ratio of Open Market Papers to GDP 0.094
Á Probability of Price Adjustment 0.75
¼ Steady State In‡ation 1.0189
Following Bernanke et al. (1998), the elasticity of the price of capital with respect to the
investment ratio, ©00¢(
e
k)=©0; isset to -0.25. The marginal costof loans ªz equals the average
historical spread between the prime bank loan rate and the treasury bill rate (0.006). As
in Chari et al. (1995), we set the reserve requirement ratio µ equal to 0:06. The elasticity
of the retail good production ² is assigned a value of 6, implying a mark-up x equal to
1.2.22 The probability for a retailer to receive a price signal 1 ¡ Á is set equal to 0:25 for
the benchmark case. This value leads to an average price …xity duration of 3 periods (3/4
21See, e.g., Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
22See e.g. Christiano et al. (1997a).
13years). Alternatively, we will also use a value of 1, implying ‡exible price adjustments of the
retailers. The former value seems to be justi…ed by the empirical price responses estimated
in section 2 and is also used in related analyses of monetary policy e¤ects in sticky price
models.23
Table 2: Parameter of the Stochastic Processes
¹mg ½omr ¾omr ½mgr ¾mgr ½a ¾a
1.0189 0.923 0.058 0.469 0.0129 0.95 0.0035
The parameters of the stochastic processes for both monetary policy measures are estimated
for the period 1984:4–1994:4.24 For the open market ratio (OMR); we applied the ratio of
the time series of open market papers outstanding (OMPAP) and non-borrowed reserves
(NBRES). For the growth rate of high-powered money, we employed the growth rate of
M1 (M1GR). We also applied the time series of the growth rate of the monetary base (M0)
which is more consistent with the model speci…cation, but does not display any signi…cant
response to exogenous monetary policy shocks (Fig. 2 and 3). Our parameter estimates for
M0 are very low (½ = 0:05;¾ = 0:0021 for 1984:4–1994:4) compared with the parameters in
similar studies which are using the time series of M1 orM2. The autoregressive parameter in
(23) for the open market ratio (money growth) is estimated at 0.923 (0.469). The standard
deviation of the respective residuals equals 0.058 (0.0129). The steady state in‡ation rate ¼
which equalsthe steady state money growth rate¹
mgr is estimated at 1.0189. The parameter
½a of the AR1 process for the technological level is assigned a value which is standard in the
business cycle literature (½a = 0:95). The standard deviation is set so that the simulation of
our benchmark model approximately replicates the empirical standard deviation of output
(¾a = 0:0035).
4 The Model’s Behavior and Numerical Results
In this section, we present the qualitative properties of our model and the numerical results.
In subsection 4.1, we describe the impact of the monetary policy shock on various macroeco-
nomic variables for our benchmark case where the monetary authority conducts monetary
policy via open market operations. Subsequently, we consider monetary policy in the form
of a change in the exogenous money growth rate. We also perform a sensitivity analysis
of our results with regard to the degree of price ‡exibility and study the persistence of the
output responses. In subsection 4.2, we assess the moments implied by the two di¤erent
speci…cations of our monetary policy shock and compare them to the empirical values.
4.1. Impulse Responses to Monetary Policy Measures
Fig. 3 presents the responses of several variables to a contractionary shock of size 0.01 in
the open market ratio (OMR) for the model with ‡exible prices (Á = 0). The responses are
expressed as percentage deviation from the steady state values of the respective variables.
In the course of an open market operation, the monetary authority imposes a higher relation
of outstanding bonds to reserves and reduces the liquidity of the …nancial system.
In period 1, when the shock hits the economy, we observe a decline in the in‡ation rate
(Fig. 3D), whereas the predetermined variables bonds, high-powered money, and physical
23See e.g. King and Wolman (1996) and Jeanne (1998).
24This period can becharacterized by a stable monetary policy regime (see e.g. Cooley and Hansen, 1998).
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15capital remain unchanged. The magnitude of the initial response of in‡ation to a shock
depends on the degree of price stickiness (compare Fig. 4) and will be found to be one of the
main factorsdrivingourresultsin thissection. In the subsequentperiods, the macroeconomic
e¤ects, particularly the anticipated in‡ation e¤ect on interest rates, are clearly dominated
by the portfolio adjustment e¤ects as resulting from the OMR shock, leading to a reduction
in the capital stock k, reserves s; and cash holdings m as well as a persistent rise in the
nominal interest rate i (Fig. 3H, C, G, and E).
The macroeconomic e¤ects of a 1% innovation to the OMR are mainly driven by the
increased amount of government bonds outstanding, as can be seen fromFig. 4B. An increase
in the open market ratio bt+1=st for given reserves st is associated with an increase in bond
holdings bt+1 of private agents on the one hand and, by the assumption of a balanced budget
(28), a decline in high-powered money ht on the other hand. In order to induce agents
to hold more bonds and less cash m, the market clearing interest rate on bonds i has to
increase. Consequently, the portfolio structures of householdsand bankschange. Households
substitute their bond holdings bh for capital k, leading to a persistent decline in the capital
stock (Fig. 3H and B). Households also reduce cash holdings m as the opportunity costs of
real balances increase with higher nominal rates i (compare equations 9 and 10).
In order to understand the adjustments in the balance sheets of the banks, we need to
study the behavior of …rms’ loan demand. Firms must obtain loans from banks in order to
pay labor and capital, see (13). An increasing interest rate i on bonds also translates into a
higher lending rate i
l according to (27). By increasing the marginal costs of capital k and
laborl, …rms decrease their laborand theircapital demand ascan be seen fromthe inspection
of the …rms’ …rst-order conditions (15)-(16). As a consequence, equilibrium employment l
and capital k fall (Fig. 3J and H). In addition, the real wage w and the interest rate r decline
as well (Fig. 3F). For constant productivity, the fall in both inputs results in a fall of total
loans z and output y. Consequently, real reserves s which are a constant fraction of loans
decline as well (Fig. 3C), but only very slightly compared to the rise in government bonds
(Fig. 3B).
In period 1, households anticipate the rise in interest rates on bonds in the subsequent
periods. As a consequence, they reduce their investment expenditures already in period 1,
while they increase their consumption and their real balance holdings (Fig. 3G and H).25
Simultaneously, they decrease their labor supply according to (5)-(6). Firms, on the other
hand, increase their labor demand as the interest rate declines. In the labor market equilib-
rium of period 1, wages increase and employment (and, hence, output) falls. The respective
responses in real terms are only of a small magnitude, since prices are totally ‡exible.
An obvious shortcoming of the model’s speci…cation with ‡exible prices is that shocks
to the OMR mainly translate into a substitution of open market securities for real balances
and capital in the agents portfolio. While changes in the asset holdings are substantial, the
impact on real activity and, therefore, on intermediated funds is of much smaller magnitude.
As can be observed in Fig. 1 and 2, this response pattern is not in accordance with estimated
impulse response functions. In particular, our estimates in section 2 indicate that, following
a shock to the OMR, non-borrowed reserves decline and open market securities rise roughly
by the same percentage change. In order to provide a more realistic speci…cation of the
25Notice that households increase their demand of bonds in both period 1 and subsequent periods. As
in the …rst period, however, the supply of bonds does not increase, the interest rate on bonds i falls. In
subsequent periods, the supply of bonds increases resulting in a rise of the interest rate i:
16Figure 4: Response to a 1% OMR Innovation with Á = 0:75 (Deviations in %)
17Figure 5: Responses to a 1% MGR Innovation with Á = 0.75 (Deviations in %)
economy, we introduce a nominal rigidity in our model and assume that retailers set their
prices in a staggered way. In an economy with rigid prices, the impact of monetary impulses
on both aggregate demand and real activity are markedly augmented.
Fig. 4 displays the responses of macroeconomic variables to the OMR shock for sticky
prices, Á = 0:75. All responses are substantially magni…ed when price staggering is intro-
duced. Considering the retail sector, a fraction 1¡Á of the retailers changes its prices every
period. In response to a fall in aggregate demand in period 1, these retailers decrease their
prices p and, initially, the in‡ation rate ¼ falls (Fig. 4D). The smaller the fraction 1¡Á, the
less pronounced is the decline of the in‡ation rate ¼ (compare with Fig. 3D). The fraction
Á of retailers increases its prices by the steady state in‡ation rate ¼ and, consequently, sells
less output yit. As the price of the wholesale good pW falls sharply, the mark-up x increases
(Fig. 4K). The rise of the mark-up ratio induces a downward pressure on factor remunera-
tion, as both the equilibrium real wage w and the real interest rate r are a negative function
of the mark-up. Consequently, aggregate production exhibits a strong decline in period 1 in
response to the contractionary monetary impulse (Fig. 4A).
For the analysis of the in‡ation rate and the real interest rate on bonds r
b, consider the
18Fisher equation: 1+rb = (1+it)¼
¡1
t : Comparing the latter with the household’s optimality
condition on capital accumulation (8), the real return on bonds rb must equal the return on
capital r, if we abstract from adjustment costs of capital. Assume that the real return on
capital falls and the nominal interest rate on bonds rises after a monetary tightening. Then,
the in‡ation rate must rise in order to ful…ll the Fisher equation. As displayed in Fig. 3D and
4D, the latter result also holds in the case of positive adjustment costs of capital. In contrast
to the case without adjustment costs, however, our benchmark model generates a rising real
rate of return on bonds (Fig 4L), well in accordance with the empirical evidence presented
in section 2.26 During the …rst …ve quarters following an OMR shock, the response of the
real return bonds (measured as the nominal return on T-bills minus the in‡ation rate), is
positive, as can be seen from Fig. 2.
In sum, in the model with price staggering, monetary aggregates, interest rates, and real
variables behave almost as observed empirically and presented in section 2, with only one
exception. Empirically, it can be found that pro…ts decline after a contractionary monetary
policy (see Fig. 2). As it is also commonly found in other models of sticky prices,27 pro…ts
of price setters (which equal the retailers’ pro…ts -r) increase in our model as the mark-up
increases during a monetary contraction and, in particular, the e¤ect of the rise in the mark-
up x is initially more pronounced than the e¤ect of a fall in the output y (Fig. 4K). This
picture changes in the case of ‡exible prices Á = 0, where retail pro…ts decline persistently
after a monetary contraction (see Fig. 3H).28
The impulse responses to a MGR shock are di¤erent from the ones to an OMR shock.
Fig. 5 presents various responses to a contractionary MGR shock. Following a contraction
of nominal money supply H, households receive less transfers ¿. Consequently, household
consumption and investment demand fall. The price behavior of the retailers is similar to
the one in the model with OMR shocks. As demand falls, the ‡exible price retailerscut their
prices p and the sticky price retailers reduce their output demand. Consequently, in‡ation
falls and the mark-up increases (Fig 5C and F). Both real factor prices, the wage rate w and
the interest rate r, decline with a higher mark-up x. As the supply of bonds B = B
h + B
b
is exogenous, the fall in the return on capital and the in‡ation rate results in a fall of the
nominal interest rate i (Fig. 5D). The household adjusts its portfolio by reducing capital
holdings k and bond holdings Bh, while it even increases real cash holdings m (Fig. 5F).
The most important di¤erence between the model with an OMR shock and the model
with a MGR shock is the counterfactual behavior of the nominal interest rate implied by the
latter model. The rate of return on bonds i and the lending rate il decrease in response to
a monetary injection. This behavior of nominal interest rates is inconsistent with empirical
evidence on the responses of nominal interest rates to various monetary policy measures as
presented in section 2. Therefore, we consider the OMR speci…cation of the monetary policy
to be more appropriate for our model.29
26In the case of the ‡exible price model, the real interest rate on bonds only rises in the …rst period, when
the in‡ation rate falls. Contrary to our benchmark model, the ‡exible price model predicts that real interest
rates on bonds are lower than the steady state value in the subsequent periods (Fig. 3L).
27See, e.g., Christiano et al. (1997).
28Bank pro…ts -b
t = (1=µ¡1)itst (not illustrated), which are only a small fraction of total pro…ts, display
a persistent rise after a transitory contraction.
29In models of limited participation, a decrease of money growth only results in a lasting rise of nominal
interest rates if both …nancial markets are subject to frictions and households face adjustment costs of their
asset portfolio (Chari et al., 1995).
194.2. Persistence and the Amplitude of Output Responses
As shown in the previous subsection, the qualitative behavior of the variables in the model
with OMR shocks is robust to variations in the price regime, whereas the magnitudes of the
responses, in particular output, change substantially. In this section, we perform an analysis
of output responses concentrating on the e¤ects of price rigidity and adjustment costs of
capital. Fig. 6 displays the responses of output to an OMR shock of 1% with adjustment
costs (©
00=©
0 = ¡0:25) and without adjustment costs (©(e=k) ¢ k = e) on the one hand and
to a MGR shock of 1% with adjustment costs on the other hand. Obviously, the amplitude
of the output responses to an OMR shock declines with more ‡exible prices, whereas the
persistence rises.
First, consider the amplitude of the output response functions. The maximum deviation
of output from its steady state value in response to a 1% OMR innovation is 0.152% and
0.0125% for Á = 0:75 and Á = 0, respectively. The estimated output response function to
an OMR shock, as presented in section 2, displays a maximum deviation of output equal
to 0.073% (Fig. 1B), lying within the range of the values computed for our model with an
OMR shock. The responses to MGR shocks are generally found to have a much stronger
amplitude than the responses to OMR shocks. In our benchmark case characterized by a
price rigidity of Á = 0:75, the contemporaneous output deviates by 8.89% from its steady
state value in response to a 1%shock to money growth. Contemplating Fig. 1A and Fig. 1B,
a 1% deviation of the M1 growth rate in response to innovations of both monetary policy
measures (FFRATE; OMR) is associated with an approximate rise of real GDP by 1.3%.30
A similar value is obtained for the empirical standard deviation of output relative to M1
growth. In particular, our estimate for the latter number amounts to b ¾
y=b ¾
mg = 1:45: From
these observations, we conclude that the output response to a MGR shock as implied by
our model is inconsistent with the empirical evidence.
Regarding the persistence of the impulse responses, we …nd that OMR shocks produce
more persistent responses than MGR shocks regardless of the degree of price rigidity. Fig. 6
shows that, in case of a monetary injection, output immediately recovers for all degrees of
price rigidity, whereas the output responses to OMR shocks display a marked persistence,
especially for more ‡exible prices. As displayed in the second row of Fig 6, the output
response to an OMR shock remains persistent, even if we abstract from adjustment costs of
capital.
31 The …ndingsin Fig. 6are supported by ourestimated autocorrelationsof simulated
output series.32 In our benchmark case with Á = 0:75 and with (without) adjustment costs
of capital, the autocorrelation of output is moderately positive amounting to ½y = 0:27
(½y = 0:17). Forcomparison, the empirical autocorrelation of outputamountstob ½
y = 0:86 in
the US economy.
33 Notice, however, that ourmodel is only simulated for an isolated shock to
monetary policy, whereasthe additional consideration of a technology shock generally results
in a higher …rst-order autocorrelation of output. In the case of a MGR shock, the estimate
30Similar response ratios cannot reasonably be calculated for innovations to broad monetary aggregates,
as empirical output impulse responses to M0 and M1 growth shocks are found to be insigni…cant, see ,e.g.,
Christiano et al. (1999) or Fig. A1D in Appendix A.
31For sticky price models with monetary injections, Chari et al. (1996) show that it is necessary to assume
adjustment costs in order to generate persistent output e¤ects.
32Autocorrelations are estimated from the simulated output series which have been logged and detrended
using the Hodrick-Prescott …lter.
33The statistics have been computed using logged and detrended time series of output (GDP92) during
1960-99.
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for output autocorrelation (½y = 0:01) is insigni…cant for our benchmark speci…cation: With
higher degrees of price ‡exibility, we …nd that the autocorrelation of output rises. For
example, we estimated a value of 0:65 for the autocorrelation of output in the model with
an OMR shock, adjustment costs of capital, and ‡exible prices.
From this discussion, we observe that there is a trade-o¤ between the amplitude and the
persistence of the output response depending on the degree of price rigidity in our model.
Surprisingly, the response of output is less persistent in the case of sticky prices. The reason
for our result is simple. After period 2, the output response to an OMR shock is mainly
driven by the persistent rise in the interest rate. Therefore, the output response pattern to
an OMR shock are almost identical after the 2nd period for ‡exible prices (Á = 0) and rigid
prices (Á = 0:75). However, in the case of sticky prices, we also observe a strong decline of
production in period 1, induced by a fall in aggregate demand. The initial output response
is much lower if all retailers are able to adjust prices instantaneously. As a consequence, if
prices are more sticky, the output response in the …rst period relative to the output response
in later periods rises and we observe a jump in the output response function in period 2. For
this reason, persistence as measured by the …rst-order autocorrelation of output declines.
214.3. Second Moments Properties of Money-related Series
In this subsection, we discussthe second momentpropertiesofmoney-related seriessimulated
with ourtheoretical model forboth speci…cations of monetary policy and compare themwith
their empirical counterparts. We start the analysis of this simulation experiment with the
discussion of selected correlations for the cases of a pure monetary policy shock in order to
isolate the e¤ectsstemming fromthe particular speci…cation of our monetary policy rule. We
apply the standard treatment of data forthe computation of the statistics in the real business
cycle literature. In particular, the moments reported in Tables 3, 4, and A1 are computed
from Hodrick-Prescott …ltered quarterly time series. Table 3 presents the contemporaneous
correlations of variables with output and the monetary policy variable for both US data
and our benchmark economy with a shock to open market operations. The correlations as
implied by our theoretical model are computed for an economy with ‡exible (Á = 0) and
staggered prices (Á = 0:75), respectively. Table 4 presents the corresponding correlations for
the economy with innovations to the technology level as an additional shock.
In the subsequent analysis, we focus on correlations of …nancial variables, which are
displayed in the upper part of each table. The last two columns in Table 3 present the
correlations of …nancial variables with both monetary policy measures in the case of an
OMR shock and ‡exible prices. The sign and the magnitude of all correlations, except for
those of bank loans, are in good accordance with the empirical correlations presented in
column 3 and 4. In the case of monetary injections, we …nd that the empirical correlations
between various variables cannot be replicated (see Table A1, column 9 in Appendix D).
E.g., instead of negative values, we …nd nearly perfect positive correlations between money
growth on the one hand and interest rates, in‡ation, and the velocity on the other hand.
Furthermore, contrary to empirical evidence, the model with monetary injections predicts a
negative money growth correlation with both output and the stock of high powered money.
These results support the view that the consideration of OMR shocks rather than of MGR
shocks is more adequate in the model with ‡exible prices.
While the ‡exible price model with OMR shocks performs well with regard to the cor-
relations between …nancial variables and monetary policy measures, the correlations with
output are inconsistent with the empirical ones. For example, instead of moderate positive
correlations, we …nd that output is almost perfectly negatively correlated with interest rates,
bonds, and the velocity. These shortcomings, together with the small standard deviation of
the simulated output series (approx. 1/18 of the empirical value), indicate that the consid-
eration of a nominal rigidity might improve the model’s performance. Accordingly, column
…ve of Table 3 shows that the correlations between output and …nancial variables as im-
plied by our model with staggered prices are clearly closer to the empirical ones than the
respective correlations implied by the ‡exible price model. At the same time, the model’s
performance with regard to the remaining correlations is also improved. A similar e¤ect
due to the introduction of sticky prices cannot be observed in the case of a MGR shock.
Even though the correlation between output and money growth displays the correct sign for
Á = 0:75 (contrary to the case Á = 0), many output and money growth correlations still
display disproportionate large values and wrong signs (compare column 6 and 7 of Table
A1 in Appendix D). Additionally, we obtain an unrealistically high standard deviation of
the simulated output series in the model with exogenous money growth, which re‡ects the
strong contemporaneous output response to monetary injections described in the previous
subsection.
22Table 3: Correlations for Open Market Operations’ Shocks
Moments of US Series Moments of Simulated Series
(1960:1-1999:1) Á = 0.75 Á = 0
Output MGR OMR Output MGR OMR Output MGR OMR
FINANCIAL SER IES:
FFRATE 0.33 -0.44 0.58 0.45 -0.22 0.38 -0.99 -0.47 0.41
PRLOANR 0.37 -0.40 0.49 - - - - - -
TBILLR 0.32 -0.47 0.57 - - - - - -
M1 0.11 0.20 -0.60 -0.23 0.32 -0.58 0.99 0.50 -0.47
M1GR -0.11 1 -0.25 0.19 1 -0.42 0.45 1 -0.34
VELOC 0.24 -0.29 0.73 0.53 -0.19 0.28 -0.99 -0.47 0.40
OMR -0.04 -0.25 1 -0.65 -0.42 1 -0.45 -0.34 1
NBRES -0.19 0.24 -0.78 0.99 0.23 -0.65 0.49 0.50 -0.74
OMPAP -0.20 -0.18 0.86 0.28 -0.26 0.54 -0.99 -0.45 0.42
DEBT 0.49 -0.15 0.24 - - - - - -
BLOANS 0.48 -0.10 0.13 0.99 0.23 -0.65 0.49 0.51 -0.74
NONFINANCIAL SER IES:
GDP92 1 -0.11 -0.04 1 0.19 -0.65 1 0.45 -0.45
GDPDF -0.68 -0.06 0.34 0.24 0.51 -0.51 0.57 0.53 -0.48
EMPL 0.83 -0.23 0.22 0.99 0.18 -0.62 0.99 0.49 -0.48
INFL (CPI) 0.36 -0.26 0.35 0.64 -0.19 0.17 -0.78 -0.27 -0.20
PROF 0.65 -0.28 -0.08 -0.99 -0.17 0.62 -0.99 -0.47 0.39
Note: The moments are computed from logged and Hodrick-Prescott …ltered data. Series not expressed
in percentage terms have been logged …rst. The statistics for the theoretical models are computed as
averages from 500 £ 150 simulations.
Up to this point, we can conclude that our sticky price model generates reasonable values
for most of the …nancial correlations in the case of an OMR shock. A closer look at the
correlations between output on the one hand and the components of our shock measure
(NBRES; OMPAP; OMR) as well as the level and the growth rate of the monetary aggre-
gate (M1; M1GR) on the otherhand suggests that some empirical moments cannotsolely be
replicated by monetary shocks. This conclusion is also supported by the correlations of the
non…nancial variables in the lower half of Table 3. Except of in‡ation, these variables exhibit
correlations with output and the monetary policy measures which are inconsistent with the
empirical ones. In order to both reconcile the behavior of our model with theses observa-
tions and to replicate the empirical standard deviation of output (the standard deviation of
output generated by our model amounts to approximately 3/5 of the empirical value), we
also consider a second, non-monetary shock. Hence, we extend the simulation experiment
and allow for innovations to the technology level. As already mentioned in section 3, we
assume that the innovations to the technology level and the innovations to the monetary
policy measure are independently distributed. The standard deviation of the technology in-
novations is chosen in order to replicate the empirical standard deviation of output with our
benchmark model. The correlations for the series simulated with both shocks are presented
in Table 4.
As can be seen in column 5 of Table 4, the additional consideration of technology shocks
leads to a slight improvement concerning the correlations between the monetary aggregates
23and output.34 The reduced correlations between output on the one hand and money, money
growth, and the open market ratio on the other hand are more favorable than in the case of
pure money shocks, whereas the output correlations with non-borrowed reserves and open
market papers remain inconsistent with the empirical ones. Turning to the lower half of
Table 4, the correlations between the non…nancial variables and output are in accordance
with the empirical correlations except for total pro…ts.35 Furthermore, the addition of tech-
nology shocks leads to insigni…cant correlations between money growth and the non…nancial
variables. Comparing these correlations with their empirical counterparts, the latter also be-
ing either insigni…cant or moderately negative, we …nd that the consideration of technology
shocks helps to improve the model’s performance.
Table 4: Correlations for Open Market Operations’ and Technological Shocks
Moments of US Series Moments of Simulated Series
(1960:1-1999:1) Á = 0.75 Á = 0
Output MGR OMR Output MGR OMR Output MGR OMR
FINANCIAL SER IES:
FFRATE 0.33 -0.44 0.58 0.36 -0.38 0.40 -0.08 -0.31 0.69
PRLOANR 0.38 -0.40 0.49 - - - - - -
TBILLR 0.32 -0.47 0.57 - - - - - -
M1 0.11 0.20 -0.60 -0.14 0.44 -0.57 0.07 0.34 -0.73
M1GR -0.11 1 -0.25 0.03 1 -0.20 -0.03 1 -0.28
VELOC 0.24 -0.29 0.73 0.51 -0.35 0.32 -0.05 -0.31 0.69
OMR -0.04 -0.25 1 -0.28 -0.20 1 0.07 -0.28 1
NBRES -0.19 0.24 -0.78 0.90 0.06 -0.34 0.19 0.41 -0.68
OMPAP -0.20 -0.18 0.86 0.16 -0.40 0.55 0.02 -0.28 0.70
DEBT 0.49 -0.15 0.24 - - - - - -
BLOANS 0.48 -0.10 0.13 0.90 0.06 -0.34 0.19 0.41 -0.68
NONFINANCIAL SER IES:
GDP92 1 -0.11 -0.04 1 0.03 -0.29 1 -0.03 0.07
GDPDF -0.68 -0.06 0.34 -0.35 0.16 -0.39 -0.37 0.27 -0.60
EMPL 0.83 -0.23 0.22 0.95 0.03 -0.28 0.91 0.09 -0.21
INFL (CPI) 0.36 -0.26 0.35 0.75 -0.07 0.14 -0.47 0.06 0.17
PROF 0.65 -0.28 -0.08 -0.85 -0.03 0.26 0.72 -0.24 0.53
Note: The moments are computed from logged and Hodrick-Prescott …ltered data. Series not expressed
in percentage terms have been logged …rst. The statistics for the theoretical models are computed as
averages from 500 £ 150 simulations.
Notice, however, that our model generates moderately negative correlations between our
34The corresponding values for the case of a MGR shock are presented in column 4 of Table A1 in
Appendix D. It is obvious by the inspection of these values that the results of the latter speci…cation remains
unsatisfactory even after adding technological shocks.
35The behavior of pro…ts has been attracting increasing attention in recent work on monetary business
cycle analysis. E.g., Christiano and Eichenbaum (1997a) conclude that the counterfactual implication for
pro…ts is the key failure of sticky price models. In fact, for our benchmark calibration, both …rms’ pro…ts
and total pro…ts (which simply equal …rms’ pro…ts plus bank pro…ts) are anticyclical, whereas …rms’ pro…ts
(and, similarly, total pro…ts) become procyclical in the case of ‡exible prices (Á = 0), and bank pro…ts are
procyclical independent of the degree of price stickiness.
24shock variable, the open market ratio, on the one hand and output, prices, and employment
on the otherhand. This resultaccords well with our…ndingin subsection 4.1that amonetary
contraction leads to a decline in output, prices, and employment. Similarly in section 2, we,
empirically, found a contraction in the exogenous component of monetary policy to imply
a negative response of output, prices, and employment as well (compare Fig. 1-3). Our
empirical contemporaneous correlations, however, do not re‡ect this kind of causality. In
particular, employment and prices are positively correlated with the open market ratio and
negatively correlated with money growth. The lacking ability of standard monetary business
cycle models to replicate these empirical observations has also been noticed by Cooley and
Hansen (1998), among others.
One possible reason for the divergence of the simulated correlations from their empirical
counterparts is our treatment of monetary policy. Like in most monetary business cycle
models, monetary policy is exogenous, while in reality the monetary authority changes its
policy depending on the state of the economy.
36 In section 2 we follow Christiano et al.
(1996) and identify output, prices, and, optionally, employment, as arguments of a mon-
etary policy function. Hence, we implicitly assume that changes in these variables induce
contemporaneous movements in the monetary policy variable. Given this speci…cation of the
policy function, an expansion of these variables results in a monetary tightening, e.g. a rise
in the open market operations. In order to reconcile the model’s behavior with empirical
observations on the OMR (or, similarly, the money growth) correlations with non-…nancial
variables, we consider the endogenization of monetary policy as a worthwhile area of future
research.37
In sum, our theoretical monetary model with an OMR shock on the one hand and a
MGR shock on the other hand cannot account for the empirical second moments of all
money-related variables. Our results, however, indicate that the sticky price model with
monetary policy speci…ed as innovations to open market operationsisable toreproduce most
monetary features of the business cycle more successfully than the model with a monetary
policy measure in the form of exogenous money growth. In our benchmark model with
an OMR shock, private agents react to an open market operation by reducing investment
expenditures, consumption, and cash holdings. Money is endogenous and, as a consequence,
the extremely high comovement between money growth and most …nancial and non…nancial
variables in the case of monetary injections breaks down. We, therefore, carefully conclude
thatmonetary businesscycle modelswith OMRshocks and endogenous monetary aggregates
are a promising alternative to standard business cycle models with exogenous money growth.
36See Christiano et al. (1997b) for a discussion of the appropriateness to specify monetary policy as an
exogenous process rather that highly reactive to the state of the economy in the analysis of quantitative
general equilibrium models.
37As proposed and analyzed by Sargent (1984) one may abstract from specifying the monetary authority’s
objective function explicitly and rather use historical data to develop a statistical model of the feedback rule
used by the government. In a similar vain, Bernanke et al. (1998), Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), and
McGrattan (1999) use Taylor rules for the speci…cation of the monetary policy (see footnote 3).
255 Conclusion
In most industrialized countries, open market operations are the dominant instrument of
monetary policy. What is more natural then as to specify monetary policy as the exchange
of securities for reserves between the monetary authority and the banks? In this paper
we identify monetary policy shocks as innovations to the ratio of outstanding open market
papers to non-borrowed reserves of banks. Our empirical analysis based upon observations
from the US economy during 1960-99 provides strong evidence for the usefulness of this
measure. In particular, we observe a signi…cant decline in output, monetary aggregates, and
price indices aswell as a signi…cant rise in short-term interestratesin response toa monetary
tightening.
We examine a business cycle model where monetary policy is conducted by open market
operations. We apply the identical monetary policy shock measure as in the empirical
analysis. We add several features which we judge tobe important aspects in ordertoenhance
empirical relevance of the theoretical model. In particular, we introduce adjustment costs
of capital, price staggering, and …nancial intermediation. The transmission of monetary
policy shocks is mainly driven by portfolio adjustments of private agents who change the
composition of real balances, bonds, and physical capital. We assess the performance of the
model to reproduce impulse response functions of our empirical analysis and second moment
properties of US time series. First, we …nd that most impulse responses of our model to
an open market operations’ shock are qualitatively equal to their empirical counterparts.
Particularly, real and nominal interest rates on bonds rise and output, aggregate demand,
factor prices as well as monetary aggregates decline persistently in response to a monetary
tightening. Considering the outputresponse to an open market shock, our model with sticky
rather than ‡exible prices is able to replicate the response amplitude of the corresponding
estimatestaken fromthe data. Second, we compare contemporaneouscorrelationsof US time
series with the correlations implied by simulations of our model. While the model generates
reasonable contemporaneous correlations between various …nancial variables and monetary
policy measures, it displays di¢culties to replicate correlations of non-…nancial variables.
The monetary policy measure presented in this paper is shown to be a promising alternative
to traditional measures. For more ambituous simulation purposes, the latter result suggests
the consideration of a monetary policy rule where the monetary authority also reacts to the
state of the economy.
266 Appendix
Appendix A: Impulse Responses of VARs with Various Policy Measures
Figure A1: Impulse Responses to One S.D. INSTR Innovations § S.E.
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Response of FFRATE to -LOG(M1GR)
Note: The impulse response functions are computed from the 5-variable VARs: (GDP_92, GDPDEFL,
PPI_RAW, INSTR, D),with INSTR 2 {OMPAP, NBRES, M1GR) and D2 {M1GR, M2GR). In thecase
of INSTR = NBRX, we apply a 6-variable VAR including GDP_92, GDPDEFL, PPI_RAW, TORES,
NBRES, D.
27Appendix B: Linearized Model for Open Market Operations’ Shocks
State variables: kt, ~ ht ´
Ht
pt¡1, ~ bt ´
Bt
pt¡1
Costates: ¼t, ¸t, qt
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28Appendix C: Selected Correlations of Simulated Series
Table A1: Correlations for Money Growth Shocks (with ¾a > 0 and ¾a = 0)
Moments of US Series Moments of Simulated Series
¾a > 0 ¾a = 0
(1960:1-1999:1) Á = 0.75 Á = 0.75 Á = 0
Output MGR Output MGR Output MGR Output MGR
FINANCIAL SER IES:
FFRATE 0.33 -0.44 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.96 -0.99 0.99
PRLOANR 0.38 -0.40 - - - - - -
TBILLR 0.32 -0.47 - - - - - -
M1 0.11 0.20 -0.37 -0.26 -0.38 -0.27 0.29 -0.32
M1GR -0.11 1 0.93 1 0.94 1 -0.99 1
VELOC 0.24 -0.29 0.99 0.94 0.99 0.95 -0.99 0.99
OMR -0.04 -0.25 - - - - - -
NBRES -0.19 0.24 -0.95 -0.91 -0.95 -0.90 0.56 -0.59
OMPAP -0.20 -0.18 -0.95 -0.91 -0.95 -0.90 0.56 -0.59
DEBT 0.49 -0.15 - - - - - -
BLOANS 0.48 -0.10 -0.95 -0.91 -0.95 -0.90 0.56 -0.59
NONFINANCIAL SER IES:
GDP92 1 -0.11 1 0.93 1 0.94 1 -0.99
GDPDF -0.68 -0.06 -0.33 -0.14 -0.36 -0.18 0.14 -0.17
EMPL 0.83 -0.23 0.99 0.92 0.99 0.93 0.99 -0.99
INFL (CPI) 0.36 -0.26 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.94 -0.89 0.90
PROF 0.65 -0.28 -0.84 -0.87 -0.82 -0.82 -0.99 0.99
Note: The moments are computed from logged and Hodrick-Prescott …ltered data. Series not expressed
in percentage terms have been logged …rst. The statistics for the theoretical models are computed as
averages from 500 £ 150 simulations.
Appendix D: Data Sources
FEDERALRESERVEBOARD, FLOW OFFUNDS: Total OpenMarketPapersOutstanding: FL893169175
(OMPAP),CreditMarketInstrumentsHoldingsoftheMonetary Authority: FL14002105(DEBT_FR),
Debt Outstanding Total Non…nancial Sectors: FL384104005 (DEBT_NF), Debt OutstandingDomes-
tic Financial Sector: FL794104005 (DEBT_F, with DEBT=DEBT_NF+DEBT_F), Non-Borrowed
Reserves (NBRES), Total Reserves (TOTRES), Required Reserves (REQ_RES).
IMF FINANCIAL STATISTICS: Federal Funds Rate (FFRATE), Treasury Bill Rate (TBILL_R), Bank
Prime Loan Rate (PRLOAN_R), M1 Seasonally Adjusted (M1), M2 Seasonally Adjusted (M2),
Demand Deposits (DMDEP).
OECD MAIN INDICATORS: Corporate Pro…ts: 421013NSA (PROFITS), CPI All Items SA: 425241K
(CPI), GDP 1992 Prices SA: 421037NSA (GDP_92), GDP Implicit Price Level SA: 421051KSA
(GDPDEFL), Bank Loans + Investments SA: 426131DSA (BLOANS), PPI Crude Goods Raw Ma-
terials: 425023K (PPI_RAW), Employment Civilian SA: 424023KSA (EMPL), Standardized Unem-
ployment Rate SA: 424117DSA (UNEMPL_R).
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